

Saudi Arabia - State Department Telegrams
To SECSTATE - EXDIS (2)

(Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia)





Department of State

WH 1
TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 9206 POSS DUPE

PAGE 01 JIDDA 00844 051033Z

43
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

033894

R 050705Z FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0115

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JIDDA 0844

EXDIS

FOR : ATHERTON FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O.: 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, SA, US
SUBJ: MESSAGE TO YAMANI

REF : STATE 25993

1. MY LETTER WAS NOT RPT NOT DELIVERED TO YAMANI AND
WILL NOT BE. HE HAD JUST LEFT FOR NEW DELHI. I WILL
TRY TO SEE HIM WHEN HE RETURNS AROUND FEB 10 AND WILL
PASS ON TO HIM THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE IN ITS FULL
STRENGTH.

2. YAMANI'S REACTION WILL BE NEGATIVE. FOR SOME TIME HE
HAS EXPRESSED SUSPICIONS THAT WE ARE DELIBERATELY DELAYING
ON THE CONSUMER/PRODUCER DIALOGUE AND I STRONGLY SUSPECT
HE HAS BEEN ENCOURAGED IN THIS BELIEF BY THE FRENCH,
THE BRITISH, AND POSSIBLY OTHERS. HE RETURNED FROM
ALGIEKS CONVINCED THAT HIS JUDGMENT WAS ACCURATE.

3. NEITHER YAMANI OR ANY OTHER SAUDI HAS SUGGESTED THAT
THE SECRETARY SEE YAMANI AND I DOUBT THEY WILL. IT WAS
MY IDEA. THEIR MUTUAL DISLIKE IS BOTH KNOWN AND UNFORTUNATE
AND A MEETING MIGHT BE ABLE TO CLEAR THE AIR.
AKJNS



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 4- 9/25/01

The seal of the United States Department of State. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The entire seal is encircled by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" at the bottom, separated by two small stars on the left and right.

2

PAGE 01 JIDDA 01241 221406Z

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

011317

R 221340Z FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0292
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION OECD PARIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JIDDA 1241

EXDIS

DECD FOR U.S. REP TO IEA

E.O.: 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, SA, US
SUBJ: NEED FOR IEA INFORMATION

1. THE BRITISH EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED FULL ACCOUNTS OF IEA MEETINGS AND VARIOUS STATEMENTS ON CONSUMER/PRODUCER COOPERATION OR CONFRONTATION MADE BY U.S. OFFICIALS. IT IS KEEPING THE SAUDIS FULLY INFORMED. WE URGENTLY REQUEST THAT WE BE GIVEN THE SAME FULL ACCOUNTS OF THESE MEETINGS SO OUR INTERPRETATION OF OUR POSITION CAN BE PASSED TO THE SAUDIS RATHER THAN HAVE OUR REMARKS FILTERED THROUGH THE BRITISH (AND VERY LIKELY OTHER IEA MEMBERS).

2. IF THE DEPARTMENT CAN NOT DO THIS, THEN WE URGENTLY REQUEST THAT APPROACHES BE MADE TO OTHER IEA MEMBERS AND THAT THE BE ASKED NOT RPT NOT TO BRIEF PRODUCER COUNTRIES ON OUR REMARKS OR POSITIONS. WE CANNOT EXPECT THAT OUR POSITIONS WILL BE INTERPRETED IN THE BEST LIGHT BY OTHERS WHO ARE WORKING ON THEIR OWN SPECIAL ARRANGMENTS WITH THE PRODUCERS.

AKINS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HR 9/25/01



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 8613

PAGE 01 JIDDA 01242 221430Z

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W
----- 011432

R 221330Z FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0293

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JIDDA 1242

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, EFIN, SA, US
SUBJ: YAMANI TO DEFEND KISSINGER ON PRODUCER/CONSUMER
CONFERENCE ISSUE

REF : STATE 25993

1. AHMED ZAKI YAMANI, SAUDI MINISTER OF PETROLEUM, HAS TOLD ME HE EXPECTS TO BE MEETING VERY SHORTLY WITH BRITISH, FRENCH AND OTHER GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES. THIS WILL PROBABLY BE WHEN HE IS IN VIENNA THE END OF THIS MONTH FOR THE OPEC MINISTERIAL MEETING. HE SAID HE WILL NOT MENTION HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER UNLESS THE BRITISH OR FRENCH AGAIN (SIC) SAY THAT THE UNITED STATES IS TRYING TO BLOCK A CONSUMER/PRODUCER CONFERENCE. IF THEY DO, HE WILL TELL THEM HE HAD LONG DISCUSSIONS WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER. SECRETARY KISSINGER ASSURED HIM HE IN NO WAY OPPOSED THE PRODUCER/CONSUMER CONFERENCE, INDEED HE FAVORED IT AND WISHED STRONGLY FOR IT TO SUCCEED. SPECIFICALLY THE SECRETARY DID NOT OPPOSE THE REPRESENTATION OF THE LDC'S IN THE CONFERENCE. HE AGREED THAT ITEMS RELATED TO ENERGY, SUCH AS FINANCE AND ENERGY INTENSIVE COMMODITIES (E.G. FERTILIZER) WOULD CERTAINLY BE DISCUSSED. HE ALSO AGREED TO INCLUDE IN THE AGENDA OTHER COMMODITIES, ALTHOUGH IT WAS ASSUMED THAT RELATIVELY LITTLE TIME WOULD BE SPEND DISCUSSING THEM.
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HR 9/25/01

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 3838

PAGE 01 JIDDA 01714 101059Z

53
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W
104398

R 101005Z MAR 75
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0527
INFO USIA WASHDC

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE JIDDA 1714

EXDIS

E.O.: 11652: N/A
TAGS: OEXC
SUBJ: SAUDI MINISTRY OF INFORMATION PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM

1. SUMMARY: SAUDI MINISTRY OF INFORMATION SENDING SEVEN-MEMBER TEAM TO UNITED STATES FOR PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM RELATED TO SAUDI FOREIGN AND ENERGY POLICIES WITH STATED PURPOSE QUOTE TO OPEN DIALOGUE UNQUOTE. SAUDI EMBASSY MAY REQUEST DEPARTMENT ASSISTANCE IN ARRANGING CONTACT WITH HGIH-LEVEL USG OFFICIALS.

2. MINISTRY OF INFORMATION PLANS TO SEND A TEAM OF SEVEN PROMINENT U.S. EDUCATED SAUDIS TO THE UNITED STATES O/A APRIL 10 FOR THE PURPOSE OF MEETING WITH U.S. PRIVATE AND GOVERNMENTAL LEADERS TO ATTEMPT OPEN LINES OF COMMUNICATION IN ORDER BETTER EXPLAIN SAUDI FOREIGN POLICY POSITION VIS-A-VIS MIDDLE EAST AND OIL SITUATIONS. PAO AND CAO MET INFORMALLY WITH CORE GROUP IN RIYADH TO ASCERTAIN EXACT NATURE OF THEIR MISSION AND IF PROPOSED VISIT COULD BE EXPLOITED IN ANY WAY TO ADVANTAGE USG.

3. PAO ADVISED THAT SAUDI EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON AND SAUDI CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL MISSION IN NEW YORK WILL COORDINATE VISIT. DR. ABDURRAHMAN SHOBEILI, DG FOR TELEVISION AND LOCAL ORGANIZER FOR GROUP, REJECTED SUGGESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF GROUP THAT PRIVATE U.S. PUBLICA RELATIONS FIRM BE CONTRACTED TO HANDLE PROGRAM, SAYING THAT THEY PREFERRED LOW-PROFILE PERSON-TO PERSON

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 JIDDA 01714 101059Z

APPROACH, CAPITALIZING ON ALREADY ESTABLISHED U.S. CONTACTS.

4. SAUDI EMBASSY WILL MOST LIKELY APPROACH STATE DEPARTMENT AND USIA FOR ASSISTANCE IN MAKING CERTAIN APPOINTMENTS AT HIGHER LEVELS OF USG. LATE DATE RECEIPT OF ABOVE INFORMATION MAY PRECLUDE MEETING ALL REQUIREMENTS OF VOLUNTARY VISITORS PROGRAM, BUT WE BELIEVE GROUP CAN BE STEERED IN DIRECTION ADVANTAGEOUS TO USG. GROUP WOULD BE INTERESTED IN MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF RELEVANT HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES, LEADING EDITORS AND PUBLISHERS, TELEVISION NEWS DIRECTORS, ACADEMIC LEADERS, WHITE HOUSE AND NSC STAFFERS, AND OPINION LEADERS IN PRIVATE SECTOR.

5. FOLLOWING COMPOSITION OF GROUP: 1) DR. ABDURRAHMAN SHOBEILI, NG, SAUDI TELEVISION; 2) DR. FAROUK AKHDAR, PETROLEUM ADVISOR TO THE CENTRAL PLANNING ORGANIZATION; 3) DR. ABDUL-RAHMAN AL ZAMIL, PROFESSOR AT CPM DHAHRAN; 4) DR. SAUD SHAWWAF, PRIVATE LEGAL CONSULTANT; 5) DR. SALEH BAWAZIR, SAUDI ASSISTANT CULTURAL ATTACHE, NEW YORK; 6) DR. JAAFAR LEGAN, SAUDI PERMANENT DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK; 7) MR. OBAID TARJOMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT, MINISTRY OF INFORMATION.

6. WE WILL FORWARD TELEGRAPHICALLY BACK-UP BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON ALL PARTICIPANTS ASAP, AS WELL AS MORE PRECISE INFORMATION ON COLLECTIVE AND SEPARATE ITINERARIES AND AREAS OF INTEREST IF DEPARTMENT DESIRES.

7. SINCE MOST COMMON COMPLAINT HEARD FROM KEY SAUDIS IS THAT AMERICANS UNWILLING HEAR ARAB POINT OF VIEW, AND SINCE THIS GROUP HAS STRESSED DESIRE FOR ESTABLISHING DIALOGUE REPEAT DIALOGUE, WE BELIEVE PROJECT DESERVES STUDIED ATTENTION AGENCY AND DEPARTMENT.

8. REQUEST WASHINGTON'S IMMEDIATE REACTION TO ABOVE AS WELL AS APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE.
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~~SECRET~~ 3727

PAGE 01 JIDDA 01717 101036Z

12
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /026 W

104183

O R 101015Z MAR 75
FM AMEMBASSY JDDA
TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 0529

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 1717

EXDIS


E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.), SA
SUBJECT: DATES FOR KISSINGER VISIT

REF: A. DAMASCUS 0905/SECTO 133
B. JIDDA 1671

1. ASSUMPTION REF (A) IS CORRECT. DIWAN HAS SAID, AND EMBOFF HAS PERSONALLY CONFIRMED, THERE IS NO VACANT HOTEL SPACE IN RIYADH UNTIL LATTER PART OF APRIL.

2. SHOULD AN OVERNIGHT STAY BY SECRETARY'S PARTY BE REQUIRED, WE WOULD HAVE TO ASK DIWAN IF THEY COULD ARRANGE FOR NEEDED SPACE TO BE VACATED ON OUR BEHALF. IN RECENT MONTHS, UNDER PRESSURE OF A RECORD NUMBER OF VIP VISITS, WE HAVE NOTED DIWAN BECOMING GUNSHY ABOUT COMMANDEERING HOTEL SPACE. THEY PROFESSED COMPLETE INABILITY TO HELP FOR FEBRUARY 15 VISIT, AND IF WE HAVE TO GO BACK TO THEM WE SHOULD RECEIVE PROPOSED DATES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

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~~SECRET~~ 9211

PAGE 01 JIDDA 03004 291018Z

11
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

090982

R 290910Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1062
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 3004

EXDIS


DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES, State Dev. 215/03
BY DA, NARA, DATE 5/12/2003

F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, SA, IS
SUBJECT: SAUDI ALARM AT ISRAELI AIR INCURSIONS AND RECENT STATE-
MENTS

REF: A. TEL AVIV 2450 B. TEL AVIV 2437 C. JIDDA 2881
D. TEL AVIV A-38 OF 2/27/75

1. WE CANNOT VOUCH FOR WHAT ISRAELI OFFICIALS ACTUALLY SAID TO HIM, BUT ONE RECENT SENATORIAL VISITOR TOLD US, AND SAID HE HAD ALSO TOLD PRINCE FAHD, THAT ISRAELI OFFICIALS, INCLUDING PERES, SAID TO HIM THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE FORCED TO MOVE AGAINST AND OCCUPY NORTHERN SAUDI ARABIA IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER WAR. WE DON'T KNOW WHAT IF ANY OTHER RECENT VISITORS TO ISRAEL MIGHT HAVE GIVEN FAHD THE SAME MESSAGE.

2. THE SAUDIS ARE ALSO SURPRISINGLY (IF UNEVENLY) INFORMED ABOUT WHAT IS BEING SAID INSIDE ISRAEL. AN EXAMPLE OF THE KIND OF THING WHICH WE MUST ASSUME THE SAUDIS ARE AWARE OF AND MAKES THEM NERVOUS WAS REPORTED IN TEL AVIV'S PRESS SUMMARY FOR APRIL 24 (REF B, PARA 13) "...ISRAEL MUST ALSO KEEP AN EYE ON SAUDI ARABIA AND MAINLY WATCH ACTIVITIES OPPOSITE EILAT, IN THE GULF OF EILAT AND OPPOSITE THE TIRAN STRAITS...A FEW YEARS AGO ISRAEL MADE A GESTURE TOWARD WASHINGTON BY EVACUATING SNAPIR (SIC-SINAFIR) ISLAND...ISRAEL WILL BE FORCED TO



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PAGE 02 JIDDA 03004 291018Z

REOCCUPY SNAPIR IF SAUDI ARABIA UNDERTAKES ANY NAVAL
OR OTHER ACTIVITIES
IN THE REGION."

3. WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO JUDGE ISRAELI INTENTIONS. PERHAPS THEY ARE ONLY SENDING SIGNALS TO THE SAUDIS BY WAY OF WARNING NOT TO BECOME TOO CLOSELY INVOLVED WITH THE CONFRONTATION STATES. WHATEVER THE INTENT, THEY HAVE SUCCEEDED IN AGITATING THE TOP LEVEL OF THE SAG INCLUDING PRINCE FAHD. THEY ARE UNFORTUNATELY ALSO IMPINGING ON VERY VITAL US INTERESTS IN SAUDI ARABIA.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 08-24-2010 BY 60322
AUTHORITY 50 USC 3024



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PAGE 01 JIDDA 03197 061321Z
51

ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

037349

J R 061345Z MAY 75
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1133
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO
AMEMBASSY SANAA
~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 3197

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES, *State Review 2/5/03*
BY *Wm*, NARA, DATE *5/12/003*

EXDIS
E.O.: 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, SA, SO
SUBJ: VISIT OF SOMALI PRESIDENT TO SAUDI ARABIA
REF: JIDDA 3074 (NOFAL)

SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSED VISIT OF SOMALI PRESIDENT
SIAD BARRE, WITH CROWN PRINCE FAHD AND KING KHALID ON
MAY 5. BOTH WERE PLEASED WITH THE VISIT AND SAID THE
COMMUNIQUE (YET TO BE ISSUED) WOULD STATE SOMALI
OPPOSITION TO FOREIGN BASES ON ITS TERRITORY. SIAD
DENIED VIGOROUSLY TO FAHD THAT ANY SOVIET BASES PRESENTLY
EXISTED AND INVITED FAHD TO SEND AN INSPECTION TEAM TO
VERIFY THIS. FAHD INTENDS TO TAKE HIM UP ON THIS AND HAS
REQUESTED OUR ASSISTANCE IN PREPARING AND BRIEFING THE
INSPECTION TEAM. END SUMMARY.
1. DURING THE AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON CROWN PRINCE FAHD
MAY 5 THE VISIT OF SOMALI PRESIDENT SIAD BARRE WAS DIS-
CUSSED AT SOME LENGTH. CROWN PRINCE FAHD WAS NOTICEABLY
PLEASED WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE VISIT. FAHD, MORE THAN
ONCE, REFERRED TO THE COMMUNIQUE WHICH HE SAID WOULD

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PAGE 02 JIDDA 03197 061321Z

BE RELEASED LATER THAT AFTERNOON. (IT HAS STILL NOT
COME OUT, BUT IS SCHEDULED FOR RELEASE 2 P.M. LOCAL.)
FAHD, WHO CLAIMS MOST OF THE CREDIT FOR THE PHRASEOLOGY
OF THE COMMUNIQUE, SAID THAT IT WOULD SHOW THE SOMALI
OPPOSES FOREIGN BASES ON ITS TERRITORY AND WILL NOT
PERMIT ANY FOREIGN POWER TO ESTABLISH LAND, SEA OR AIR
FACILITIES WHICH COULD BE INJURIOUS TO THE AREA AS A
WHOLE OR TO FELLOW ARAB AND MUSLIM PEOPLES. (OTHER
ASPECTS OF SIAD VISIT BY SEPTEL.)

2. FAHD SAID THAT HE HAD HAD TWO LONG SESSIONS WITH SIAD
BARRE - ON OF THEM A TETE-A-TETE - AND THAT HE HAD PRESSED
SIAD HEAVILY ON THE QUESTION OF PERMITTING A STRATEGIC
PART OF AFRICA AND THE ARAB/MUSLIM WORLD TO BECOME A

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PAGE 2



MICHAEL ROLAND
75 JIDDA 3197

~~SECRET~~

THRIVING REFUGE FOR COMMUNISTS. FAHD SAID THAT HE HAD TO OFFER ARAB COUNTRIES (EGYPT, IRAQ, SYRIA) WHICH HAD ONCE SHORT-SIGHTEDLY GOTTEN TOO CLOSE TO THE COMMUNISTS AND NOW HAD SEEN THE ERRORS OF THEIR WAYS. FAHD SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD SIAD THAT HE UNDERSTANDS THAT SOMALIA IS A POOR COUNTRY AND THAT SIAD IS TRYING TO IMPROVE THE LOT OF THE PEOPLE. FAHD SAID SAUDI ARABIA IS WILLING TO ASSIST IN ACHIEVING THAT GOAL BUT THAT IT WILL HAVE TO SEE CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE AID IT IS PREPARED TO GIVE WILL NOT BE WASTED OR GO FOR PURPOSES PREJUDICIAL TO SAUDI INTERESTS.

3. FAHD SAID THAT HE THEN QUESTIONED SIAD SHARPLY ABOUT THE BASES AND FACILITIES SOMALIA HAD PUT AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE SOVIET UNION. SIAD STRONGLY AND REPEATEDLY DENIED THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH BASES. (FAHD SAID THAT THIS WOULD BY IMPLICATION BE ASSERTED BY THE COMMUNISTS.) SIAD INVITED FAHD TO SEND A MILITARY DELEGATION TO SOMALIA TO INSPECT AND OBSERVE THAT THERE ARE NO SOVIET FACILITIES THERE. IF HE WISHED, HE WAS WELCOME TO GO HIMSELF. FAHD SAID THAT THOUGH HE WOULDN'T GO HE INTENDED TO SEND A DELEGATION SHORTLY. HE ASKED OUR ASSISTANCE IN PROVIDING A BACKGROUND BRIEFING TO THE MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO CONDUCT A MEANINGFUL INSPECTION.

4. THE AMBASSADOR CALLED ON KING KHALID LATER IN THE DAY AND FOUND HIM TO BE TAKING MOST OF THE CREDIT FOR THE

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PAGE 03 JIDDA 03197 061321Z

HAD LIVED WITH SIAD. KHALID POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD REFUSED TO GO TO THE AIRPORT TO MEET HIM AND HAD ORDERED CROWN PRINCE FAHD NOT TO GO (SIAD WAS MET BY THE GOVERNOR OF MECCA, PRINCE FAWWAZ). KHALID ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD SIAD REPEATEDLY OF THE DANGERS OF DEALING WITH COMMUNISTS.

5. COMMENT AND ACTION REQUESTED:

FAHD ALMOST CERTAINLY WAS THE INSPIRATION FOR THE APPROACH TO SIAD. HE WAS PROBABLY GIVEN STRONG SUPPORT BY MINISTER OF DEFENSE PRINCE SULTAN. BUT IT IS COMFORTING THAT THE KING ALSO FOLLOWED THE LINE SO FAITHFULLY.

6. NORMAL SAUDI POLITENESS MIGHT HAVE LED FAHD TO DECLINE THE INVITATION TO SEND AN INSPECTION TEAM SINCE ACCEPTING WOULD BE SUCH A OBVIOUS SIGN THAT HE DOESN'T TRUST SIAD'S WORD. IN THIS CASE, HOWEVER, THE SAUDIS ARE PREPARED TO SEND A DELEGATION. THE SAUDI CONCERN WITH SOMALIA HAS BEEN HEIGHTENED BY REPEATED USG DEMARCHES ON THE SUBJECT - FIRST BY SECRETARY KISSINGER, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY BY THE AMBASSADOR IN HIS MEETINGS WITH THE SAUDIS AND MOST RECENTLY BY DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CLEMENTS. THE SAUDIS THEREFORE ARE LOOKING TO US FOR GUIDANCE. THEY WILL WANT TO SEND SOMEONE VERY SOON BEFORE INSTALLATIONS COULD BE CHANGED OR REMOVED. WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ON AN URGENT BASIS:

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KUCHEL ROLAND
75 JIDDA 3197


~~SECRET~~

- A) PHOTOGRAPHS AND MAPS OF THE AREAS OF SOVIET INSTALLATIONS WHICH WILL ENABLE THE SAUDI DELEGATION EASILY TO FIND AND IDENTIFY THEM;
- B) IF POSSIBLE, SOMEONE TO COME OUT HERE TO BRIEF THE SAJDIS ON WHAT THEY CAN EXPECT TO SEE AND WHAT THEY SHOULD BE ON THE LOOKOUT FOR.

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The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the document. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars flank the central emblem.

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PAGE 01 JIDDA 03235 080534Z

12
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

061683

P R 080430Z MAY 75
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1144
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 3235

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES *State Review 2/5/03*
BY *lwh*, NARA, DATE *5/12/2003*

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, SA, IR
SUBJECT: SHAH OF IRAN'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA
REF: TEHRAN 4087

1. DURING THE AMBASSADOR'S MAY 5 MEETING WITH CROWN PRINCE FAHD, FAHD DESCRIBED THE SHAH'S RECENT VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA AS HAVING BEEN "GOOD AND TIMELY." HE SAID THAT HE HAD GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH THE SHAH BASED UPON "GREAT MUTUAL COMPATIBILITY" AND THAT THE VISIT HAD HELPED TO STRENGTHEN THESE RELATIONS.
2. FAHD SAID THESE TWO NEIGHBORING MUSLIM COUNTRIES SHOULD COOPERATE FOR THE GOOD OF THE WHOLE AREA. IN THE PAST THE SHAH'S RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD HAD BEEN LESS THAN WARM AND FRIENDLY, WHICH FAHD SAID WAS LARGELY THE RESULT OF NASSER'S POLICIES.
3. FAHD SAID THAT SAUDI ARABIA'S POLICY WAS TO CULTIVATE FRIENDS AND TO TURN ENEMIES INTO FRIENDS AND IN THE LIGHT OF THIS HE SAW NO REASON WHY THE SHAH WOULD NOT MAKE AN EFFORT TO FURTHER IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 JIDDA 03235 080534Z

4. COMMENT: THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR HERE TELLS US THAT THE SHAH TOLD HIS COUNTERPART IN TEHRAN THAT HE HAD BEEN PLEASANTLY SURPRISED BY HIS MEETING WITH KING KHALID: HE HAD BEEN EXPECTING A CIPHER BUT FOUND A PERSON OF SOME SUBSTANCE. FAHD HAS FOR SOME TIME FELT WELL DISPOSED TOWARDS THE SHAH. WE SUSPECT THAT THE SHAH'S REGARD FOR KHALID MAY IN FACT HAVE RESULTED FROM A DEGREE OF DEFERENCE ON KHALID'S PART WHICH FAISAL NEVER SHOWED. THE SHAH DIDN'T LIKE FAISAL WHOM HE CONSIDERED FANATICAL AND INFLEXIBLE; THE LATE KING FOR HIS PART FOUND THE SHAH ARROGANT AND OVER-BEARING. THEIR RARE MEETINGS COULD BE COUNTED AS SUCCESSES IF RELATIONS DIDN'T DETERIORATE AS A RESULT. SINCE PERSONALITIES COUNT FOR A GREAT DEAL IN SAUDI ARABIA, AS THEY DO IN IRAN, WE CAN HOPE FOR SOME FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN SAUDI-IRANIAN RELATIONS.

5. ULTIMATELY, HOWEVER, THESE RELATIONS WILL DEPEND ON PERCEIVED MUTUAL SELF INTEREST AND COULD RAPIDLY FOUNDER OVER POLICY DIFFERENCES. NOTHING, FOR INSTANCE, COULD BE MORE LIKELY TO CAUSE A RAPID SOURING OF RELATIONS THAN THE CREATION OF A "TEHRAN-CAIRO AXIS," WHICH THE SAUDIS COULD ONLY SEE AS DESIGNED TO SKEWER THE KINGDOM. WE DEFER, OF COURSE, TO THE JUDGMENT OF EMBASSY CAIRO, BUT IMAGINE THAT THE EGYPTIANS WOULD NOT RPT NOT UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES BE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN SUCH AN AXIS. EHPYIAN ARABISM MAY BE FLAWED BUT WE CANNOT PICTURE EGYPT BEING COMFORTABLE IN AN ALLIANCE WITH A NON-ARAB STATE WHICH OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES PERCEIVE AS THREATENING.

7. IF, HOWEVER, SUCH AN AXIS WERE TO COME ABOUT IT COULD WELL PUSH SAUDI FOREIGN POLICY OFF IN DIRECTIONS WE WOULD PROBABLY NOT CONSIDER TO BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE SECURITY OF THE REGION. A RIYADH-BAGHDAD-DAMASCUS AXIS SEEMS DISTINCTLY IMPLAUSIBLE AT THE PRESENT MOMENT BUT THE SHAH MIGHT HAVE THE ABILITY TO BRING IT OFF.



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PAGE 03 JIDDA 03235 080534Z

8. AS FOR THE SHAH'S REACTION TO A QADHAFFI TYPE GOVERNMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA, WE HAVE GIVEN SERIOUS THOUGHT TO WHETHER U.S. INTERESTS COULD TOLERATE SUCH AN EVENTUALITY AND RAISED THIS ISSUE IN COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE DEPARTMENT. WE HAVE EQUALLY GRAVE DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER WE COULD TOLERATE IRANIAN CONTROL OVER THE PETROLEUM RESOURCES OF BOTH SIDES OF THE PERSIAN GULF. THE SHAH APPARENTLY RAISED THE QUESTION CASUALLY. WE SHOULD NOT DISMISS IT IN THE SAME WAY.
AKINS



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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 8770

PAGE 01 JIDDA 03303 111037Z

21
ACTION 58-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

094029

R 110926Z MAY 75
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1175
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 3303

EXDTS

E.O.: 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, SA, US
SUBJ: YAMANI INSISTS ON NEED FOR IMMEDIATE PREPCON

REF : STATE 108279

SUMMARY: YAMANI HAS COMPLAINED THAT WE HAVE NOT COME UP WITH A NEW APPROACH. HE THINKS ANOTHER PRECON IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH AN AGENDA. AGREEMENT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE, PERHAPS ON PARALLEL MEETINGS WITH THE ENERGY MEETINGS CLEARLY THE MOST IMPORTANT. IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISIONS WOULD TAKE A LONG TIME AND RESULTS OF ALL CONFERENCES WOULD HAVE TO BE TIED TOGETHER, HE BELIEVES. YAMANI FEELS ONLY IF THERE IS PROGRESS ON A PRECON WILL SAUDI ARABIA HAVE A CHANCE OF PREVENTING A SUBSTANTIAL PRICE INCREASE AT THE GABON OPEC CONFERENCE IN JUNE. SAUDI ARABIA WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO USE ITS PRODUCTION CAPACITY ENTIRELY WITHOUT REGARD TO THE INTERESTS OF OTHER MEMBERS OF OPEC. YAMANI HAS DESIGNATED ABDUL HADY TAHER FOR DISCUSSIONS TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF JOINT U.S.-

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 JIDDA 03303 111037Z

SAUDI APPROACHES TO THE PRODUCER-CONSUMER CONFERENCE.
ACTION REQUESTED: DEPARTMENT COMMENTS AND SPECIFIC IDEAS
ON HOW TO GET THE PREPCON BACK ON TRACKS IF WE, IN
FACT, WANT THIS DONE. END SUMMARY.

1. I SAW YAMANI MAY 9 AND RASIED ALL THE PERTINENT
POINTS IN REFTEL. YAMANI SAID THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE
SOME BASIC CONFUSION. WE WERE SIMPLY ASKING, HE SAID,
"WHAT ARE YOUR IDEAS? WE WILL LISTEN TO THEM AND TAKE
THEM INTO ACCOUNT." HIS NOTES OF HIS TALKS IN WASHINGTON,
HE SAID, SHOWED SOMETHING QUITE DIFFERENT; I.E. THE
UNITED STATES WOULD GIVE THE MATTER CAREFUL THOUGHT AND
I WOULD THEN DISCUSS OUR NEW IDEAS WITH HIM. HE AND I
WOULD THEN TRY TO WORK OUT A SATISFACTORY COMPROMISE BUT
HE SAID I WAS PRESENTING NO NEW IDEAS - NO NEW THINKING
WHATSOEVER.

2. I SUGGESTED THAT THIS ALPHONSE-GASTON ROUTINE WOULD
LEAD NOWHERE. WE SHOULD SEE WHERE WE CAN GO FROM HERE.
HE AGREED.

3. WHILE THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PARIS PREPCON MAY NOT
BE ANXIOUS TO HOLD ANOTHER PREPCON OR EVEN THE FULL
CONFERENCE (REFTEL), YAMANI CLEARLY IS. YAMANI SAID THERE
WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF DISPENSING WITH THE PREPCON; THE
AGENDA HAS TO BE SET UP AND THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE FULL
CONFERENCE HAS TO BE DECIDED.

4. YAMANI SAID THE PREPCON SHOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE ON
PARALLEL MEETINGS ON ENERGY AND RELATED MATTERS AND ON
OTHER COMMODITIES. THE ENERGY MEETINGS WERE CLEARLY THE
MOST IMPORTANT; THEY COULD BE HELD AND EVEN CONCLUDED
BEFORE AGREEMENT ON OTHER MATTERS WAS REACHED, BUT EVEN
BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE SOME TYING
TOGETHER OF ALL THE ISSUES. YAMANI ADMITTED THIS COULD
TAKE A LONG TIME.

5. HE SAID IT WAS "ESSENTIAL" THAT THE PREPCON BE HELD
BEFORE THE JUNE 9 OPEC MEETING IN GABON. IF IT IS AND IF
THERE IS SOME CHANCE OF A SUCCESSFUL SUBSEQUENT MEETING,
THEN SAUDI ARABIA CAN PROBABLY HOLD THE LINE ON OIL



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 JIDDA 03303 111037Z

PRICES. IF NOT, SAUDI ARABIA WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RESIST THE DEMAND FOR A SUBSTANTIAL PRICE INCREASE FROM "ALL OTHER OPEC COUNTRIES." OIL PRICES, HE SAID, HAVE GONE DOWN AND YET WORLD INFLATION CONTINUES; THE OPEC COUNTRIES ARE PAYING 15-20 PERCENT MORE FOR THEIR IMPORTED GOODS THAN THEY DID A YEAR AGO.

6. I TOLD YAMANI THAT SAUDI ARABIA WAS NOW IN A DIFFERENT POSITION. HIS TALK ABOUT PRESSURE FROM OTHER OPEC COUNTRIES WAS NO LONGER CONVINCING. IN THE PAST WE KNEW SAUDI ARABIA COULD NOT RPT NOT IMPOSE ITS WILL ON OPEC; ITS SPARE PRODUCTION CAPACITY WAS NOT AS GREAT AS THE REST OF OPEC'S CAPACITY TO REDUCE CONSUMPTION. SAUDI ARABIA WAS NOW ALMOST LITERALLY IN THE POSITION OF TEXAS IN THE UNITED STATES TWENTY YEARS AGO. WHATEVER IT WANTED ON OIL PRICES OR SUPPLIES IT COULD GET. IT PRODUCTION CAPACITY WAS GREAT AND GROWING; THE REST OF OPEC'S ABILITY TO REDUCE PRODUCTION WAS SMALL AND SHRINKING.

7. YAMANI SAID THIS WAS A MATTER OF SOME SATISFACTION TO THE SAUDIS BUT THE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TEXAS AND SAUDI ARABIA WAS THAT SAUDI ARABIA HAD TO TAKE POLITICS INTO ACCOUNT. TEXAS DID NOT. SAUDI ARABIA COULD NOT RISK ALIENATING THE REST OF OPEC, ESPECIALLY AS THE UNITED STATES AND THE CONSUMERS HAD SHOWN NO RPT NO DISPOSITION IN THE PAST TO SUPPORT THE SAUDIS BY PUTTING PRESSURE ON OTHER OPEC COUNTRIES TO MODERATE THEIR PRICE DEMANDS.

8. AS THE CONVERSATION SEEMED TO BE DETERIORATING, YAMANI SUGGESTED THAT I SEE WHAT COULD BE WORKED OUT OF THE PRODUCER-CONSUMER CONFERENCE OR TH PREPCON WITH ABDOUL HADY TAHER, GOVERNOR OF PETROMIN, WHO ATTENDED THE PARIS MEETING. WE WILL SEE ABDOUL HADY TODAY (MAY 11) AND TRY TO REDUCE SOMETHING TO PAPER. I WILL THEN DISCUSS IT WITH YAMANI ON MAY 12 OR 13 (IF YAMANI HAS NOT GONE BACK TO DAMASCUS AND BAGHDAD), AND WILL SEND WHATEVER RESULTS TO WASHINGTON.

9. COMMENT AND ACTION REQUESTED: IN THE MEANTIME, WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING ANY SPECIFIC IDEAS THE



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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 04 JIDDA 03303 111037Z

DEPARTMENT HAS NO HOW TO GET THE CONFERENCE OR THE PREP-
CON RESUMED - ASSUMING WE WANT IT TO BE RESUMED. WHEN
YAMANI FEELS HE IS BEING REASONABLE (AND HE DOES HERE)
AND IS BEING DELIBERATELY FRUSTRATED, HE FREQUENTLY TAKES
ACTIONS WHICH SHOW WHY COOPERATION WITH HIM IS IMPORTANT.
(THE DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL SEVERAL SUCH REACTIONS IN
THE PAST, E.G. THE ABU DHABI OPEAC MEETING.) IT IS QUITE
CLEAR TO ME THAT IF THERE IS NOT SOME MOVEMENT TOWARD
THE PRODUCER-CONSUMER CONFERENCE - EVEN AN AGREEMENT TO
HOLD ANOTHER PRERCON MIGHT DO - THEN SAUDI ARABIA WILL
SIT ON ITS HANDS IN GABON AND TACITLY APPROVE OPEC'S
DEMANDS FOR SUBSTANTIAL NEW PRICE INCREASES AND THE
DOWNWARD PATH TO CONFRONTATION WILL HAVE BEEN NICELY
GREASED.
AKTNS



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~~SECRET~~ 0775

43
ACTION SS-25

105775

R 201220Z MAY 75
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1289
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 3581

EXDIS

E.O.: 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, SA
SUBJ: REORGANIZATION OF SAUDI GOVERNMENT

REF : JIDDA 2794

1. HISHAM NAZER, MINISTER OF PLANNING, TOLD ME MAY 18 THAT ZAKI YAMANI'S COMMITTEE TO RE-EXAMIN SAUDI LAWS (REFTEL WAS ENLARGING ITS SCOPE. IT IS PROPOSING A FULL REORGANIZATION OF THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT.

2. NAZER SAID THE MOST IMPORTANT CHANGE WOULD BE IN THE DEVELOPMENT FIELD WHERE VARIOUS MAJOR PROJECTS WOULD BE SET UP UNDER ROYAL COMMISSIONS, E.G. THE \$5 BILLION PROJECT TO ELECTRIFY THE EASTERN PROVINCE, THE INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AT JUBAIL (\$8-10 BILLION), AND THE PORT AND IN-

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 JIDDA 03581 201443Z

INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AT YANBU, NORTH OF JIDDA (ABOUT \$3-5 BILLION).

3. THE SECOND IMPORTANT CHANGE WOULD BE STRIPPING THE FINANCE MINISTRY OF MOST OF ITS FUNCTIONS. IT WOULD BE REDUCED STRICTLY TO A "TREASURY." IT WOULD NO LONGER PERFORM THE FUNCTIONS PERFORMED IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE OMB; ITS VERY CONSIDERABLE AUTHORITY IN STATISTICS, PERSONNEL MATTERS AND HOUSING WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO OTHER MINISTRIES.

4. RATHER SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN THE CABINET ARE ALSO EXPECTED WITHIN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS, POSSIBLY BEFORE THE BUDGET COMES OUT IN JULY. NAZER DID NOT GIVE ANY DETAILS ON PERSONNEL MOVEMENTS BUT DID SAY THAT SEVERAL NEW MINISTRIES WOULD BE SET UP. WE HAVE HEARD FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT THERE ARE TO BE MINISTRIES OF SCIENCE AND HIGHER EDUCATION, OF HOUSING AND OF MUNICIPALITIES. THERE MAY BE OTHERS.

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06940

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9

PAGE 01 JIODA 03588 201524Z

53
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

106405

O R 201500Z MAY 75
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1296
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 3588

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, PFUR, SA, US
SUBJECT: SAUDI REACTION TO SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S STATEMENTS
ON USING FORCE IN MIDDLE EAST; VISIT OF UNDER SECRETARY
ROBINSON TO THE KINGDOM

REF: A) STATE 115497; B) JIDDA 3543; C) STATE 116290

1. MESSAGE CONTAINED REF A WAS PASSED TO PRINCE FAHD'S OFFICE YESTERDAY (MAY 19). THE AMBASSADOR PASSED THE SAME MESSAGE TO MOHAMMAD MAS'UD, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, THIS AFTERNOON (MAY 20). HE CALLED FAHD'S OFFICE IN RIYADH IMMEDIATELY TO CONFIRM THE APPOINTMENT FOR SECRETARY ROBINSON. THE NEGATIVE REACTION REPORTED IN REF B WAS CAUSED, AS WE HAD SUSPECTED, BY THE SAUDI REACTION TO SCHLESINGER'S STATEMENTS. THEY THOUGHT THAT "UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES" THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE VERY LITTLE FAHD AND THE UNDER SECRETARY WOULD HAVE TO SAY TO EACH OTHER.

2. THE AMBASSADOR TOLD MAS'UD, WHO PASSED IT IMMEDIATELY TO FHAD'S OFFICE, THERE WERE MATTERS OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO BE DISCUSSED; MATTERS IN WHICH THE SAUDIS THEMSELVES WERE INTIMATELY INVOLVED. IF PRINCE FHAD WISHED TO MAKE ANY COMMENTS ON THE SCHLESINGER STATEMENTS HE WOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO DIRECTLY TO

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 JIDDA 03588 201524Z

SECRETARY ROBINSON. AFTER SOME WRANGLING, FAHD'S
OFFICE SAID THIS SEEMED REASONABLE AND THEY WOULD
TRY TO SET UP SOMETHING MAY 21.
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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 6334

PAGE 01 JTDDA 03632 220954Z

14-11
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

W 12215

0 R 220850Z MAY 75
FM AMEMBASSY JIODA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1316
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY REIRUT
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 3632

EXDIS

DEPT: PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY FROM ROBINSON

F.O.: 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, SA, US

SUBJ: KING KHALID'S AND PRINCE FAHD'S REACTIONS TO SECDEF
SCHLESINGER'S STATEMENTS ON USE OF FORCE IN EVENT
OF OIL EMBARGO

1. SUMMARY: KING KHALID ASKED TO SEE ME BEFORE MY MEETING WITH PRINCE FAHD MAY 21. UPPERMOST ON BOTH THEIR MINDS WERE SECDEF'S STATEMENTS ON USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN EVENT OF OIL EMBARGO. BOTH STRONGLY CONDEMNED SCHLESINGER REMARKS ESPECIALLY IN THEIR TIMING BEFORE SALZBURG. FAHD STRESSED NEED FOR RETRACTION OF REMARKS AND/OR ISSUANCE OF POSITIVE USG STATEMENT AFFIRMING OUR DESIRE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH ARABS AND REJECTION OF "INVASION POLICY:" OTHERWISE HE FORESAW VERY BAD EFFECTS ON OUR RELATIONS WITH MODERATE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES

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ARABS, ON SALZBURG MEETING AND ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS
WITH SAUDI ARABIA.

3. KING GRADUALLY REDUCED THE ARDOR OF HIS OUTBURST AND AT THE END EXPRESSED CAUTIOUS CONFIDENCE IN CONTINUATION OF CLOSE US/SAUDI RELATIONS PROVIDED SOMETHING COULD BE DONE ABOUT SECY. SCHLESINGER'S STATEMENTS. KING ASSERTED DESIRABILITY OF SPEAKING FRANKLY TO FRIENDS AS BASIS FOR HIS INTERCESSION WITH ME. DURING FIRST PART OF HIS DISSERTATION KING DID NOT LOOK AT ME, DIRECTING HIS REMARKS TO INTERPRETER AND HIS ASSISTANTS, WHO NODDED APPROVAL OF HIS REMARKS FROM TIME TO TIME. LATER HE BECAME MORE FRIENDLY AND LISTENED TO MY RESPONSES (SUMMARIZED BELOW), THOUGH HE CLEARLY CONSIDERED THEM INADEQUATE TO THE TASK.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 JIDDA 03632 220954Z

AND MATTHEWS WITH ME. SINCE I KNEW WHAT WAS ON HIS MIND FROM AKINS' DISCUSSION WITH HIM YESTERDAY, I BEGAN BY EXPRESSING REGRET THAT SECY. SCHLESINGER'S REMARKS HAD RECEIVED SUCH HEAVY ATTENTION. WHILE I HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS, I COULD TELL FROM READING THE TEXTS OF HIS REMARKS (ABC AND U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT AS CARRIED IN WIRELESS FILE) THAT HE HAD BEEN PRESSED HARD BY REPORTERS TO ANSWER A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION WHICH HE HAD HAD TO ANSWER BEFORE; HE HAD RESPONDED IN THE SAME TERMS AS PREVIOUSLY, MAKING CLEAR THE POSED SITUATION WAS UNLIKELY; AND HE HAD PRESUMABLY FELT THAT A DIFFERENT ANSWER NOW WOULD HAVE AROUSED UNHELPFUL SPECULATION ABOUT THE CAUSES OF A REVISED RESPONSE. IN ESSENCE SECY. SCHLESINGER HAD SAID NOTHING NEW, IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THE PRESS WAS PAYING SO MUCH ATTENTION TO IT, AND I HOPED HIS REMARKS WOULD BE SEEN IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE.

5. PRINCE FAHD'S PRESENTATION WAS MORE TIGHTLY REASONED, MORE CAREFULLY PREPARED AND LESS EMOTIONAL THAN HIS KING'S, BUT NO LESS FURECFUL. AFTER HEARING ME OUT (AND BEFORE PERMITTING ME TO GO TO DISCUSS REAL REASONS FOR MY VISIT-AID TO EGYPT AND PRODUCER-CONSUMER DEVELOPMENTS-COVERED SEPTELS), FAHD EXPRESSED NEED TO SPEAK HONESTLY AND FRANKLY WITH FRIENDS FOR OUR MUTUAL BENEFIT. HE RECOUNTED HISTORY OF LONG-STANDING SAUDI SUPPORT FOR US, THE ATTACKS SAUDI ARABIA HAD SUFFERED AS A RESULT FROM OTHERS, AND ITS PRIDE THAT FINALLY OTHER ARAPS WERE COMING AROUND TO THEIR VIEW POINT AFTER YEARS OF HAVING BEEN PERSUADED BY NASSER THAT THEIR SALVATION LAY WITH THE SOVIETS.

6. STATEMENTS SUCH AS SECDEF'S CARRIED PROBLEMS OF PERMITTING CRITICS OF US AND SAUDI ARABIA TO SAY "WE TOLD YOU SO" AND OF EMBARRASSING SAUDI LEADERS WHEN THEY TRY TO CONVINCE THEIR PEOPLE THAT THE US IS THEIR TRUE FRIEND. TIMING OF THESE REMARKS WAS "MISERABLE" -- WHEN SAUDIS WERE LEANING OVER BACKWARD IN THEIR EFFORTS TO MODERATE IRAQ, THE GULF STATES AND THE PALESTINIANS; AND COMING JUST BEFORE THE SALZBURG MEETING. SADAI COULD BE GREATLY EMBARKASSED, WITH THE SOVIETS AND THE LEFTIST PRESS ALREADY ASKING HOW HE COULD MEET PRESIDENT FORD AFTER THE LATTER PERMITS ONE OF HIS SENIOR CABINET MEMBERS TO THREATEN TO

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 04 JIDDA 03632 220954Z

INVADE THE ARAB OIL COUNTRIES. WHILE FAHD DID NOT BELIEVE THAT US INTENTION WAS TO INVADE, HE DID NOT WANT TO BE IN THE MINORITY IN THIS VIEW.

11. FAHD ASKED WHAT WE WANTED SAUDI ARABIA TO DO: AFTER ALL, IT HAD BEEN IN THE FOREFRONT IN OPEC IN PREVENTING OIL PRICE INCREASES AND PRODUCTION CUTS, AND REFUSED TO PERMIT HARM TO COME TO US AND OTHER FRIENDLY ECONOMIES. ALSO, WHY DID WE DIRECT OUR STATEMENTS AGAINST THE ARABS? THERE WERE OTHER OIL PRODUCERS?

8. FAHD ADVERTED THREE TIMES DURING HIS LENGTHY PRESENTATION TO THE ABSOLUTE NEED, FOR THE SAKE OF US, SAUDI AND EGYPTIAN INTERESTS, FOR THE US TO DO SOMETHING TO COUNTER THE IMPACT OF SELDEF'S REMARKS BEFORE THE SALZBURG MEETING. HE SUGGESTED THEY BE "WITHDRAWN, REPUDIATED, RESCINDED OR AMENDED." AT THE END OF MEETING AFTER OTHER SUBJECTS WERE DISCUSSED, HE RETURNED TO THIS TOPIC AND SUGGESTED WE ISSUE A "POSITIVE" STATEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND CERTAINLY BEFORE SALZBURG IS "ABSOLUTELY VITAL" TO THE EFFECT THAT US POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST WAS NEVER BASED ON ANY INVASION THEORY BUT ON THE CONTRARY WAS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO DEEPENING AND REINFORCING OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS. IF THESE STATEMENTS WERE LEFT DANGLING, BAD THINGS WOULD BEFALL US (THE SOVIETS WOULD DESTROY OR EVEN PREVENT THE SALZBURG MEETING); IF THEY WERE CORRECTED, SAUDI ARABIA, THE GULF STATES, AND OTHER MODERATE ARABS WOULD BREATHE A SIGH OF RELIEF AND CONTINUE THEIR SUPPORT OF THE US.

9. I REPEATED MY EARLIER REGRETS THIS ISSUE HAD ARISEN AND SAID I WOULD REPORT TO SECY. KISSINGER FULLY THE FORCEFUL VIEWS OF KING KHALID AND PRINCE FAHD ON THIS SUBJECT.
AKTNS

NOTE BY DC/T: NOT PASSED TO SECRETARY.



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06942

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~~SECRET~~ 6248

11
ACTION SS-25

012209

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES, *State Review 2/5/03*
BY Ma, NARA, DATE 5/12/2003

EXDIS

REF : A. JIDDA 3632; B. JIDDA 2881; C. JIDDA 3004

1. PRINCE FHAID TOLD UNDER SECRETARY ROBINSON (REF A) THAT EARLY IN THE YEAR ISRAELI OFFICIALS HAD TOLD VISITORS THAT IN THE NEXT ISRAELI-ARAB WAR ISRAEL WOULD OCCUPY NORTHERN SAUDI ARABIA. A MONTH AGO IN A MOVE THE SAUDIS INTERPRETED AS ADVANCE PLANNING FOR THIS ATTACK, A LARGE NUMBER OF ISRAELI AIRCRAFT PENETRATED DEEP INTO SAUDI ARABIA (REF B). HE HAS ASKED THE U.S. TO TRY TO PUT A STOP TO THIS ISRAELI AGGRESSION. HE PARTICULARLY WANTED A STATEMENT FROM THE U.S. CONDEMNING THE ISRAELI OVERFLIGHT AND ASSURING SAUDI ARABIA OF U.S. SUPPORT IF ISRAEL WERE TO ATTACK IT. SO FAR HE HAD HEARD NOTHING

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 JIDDA 03633 220955Z

FROM US OTHER THAN THAT WE HAD MADE INQUIRIES OF THE
ISRAELIS. HE FELT THIS SILENCE COULD BE INTERPRETED AS
U.S. CONCURRENCE IN THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION OR PLANNED
AGGRESSION.
AKINS



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06943

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12

~~SECRET~~ 6344

PAGE 01 JIODA 03635 221016Z

20
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

012476

P R 220900Z MAY 75
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 1319
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY DOHA

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES *State Review 2/5/03*
BY *ah*, NARA, DATE *5/12/2003*

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 3635

EXDIS

ANKARA FOR ASST. SECTY ATHERTON

F.O.: 11652: XGDS-1
 TAGS: EAID, USEGJC, OVIP (ROBINSON, CHARLES W.)
 SURJ: AID TO EGYPT

1. SUMMARY: PRINCE FAHD AND MINISTER STATE FOR FINANCE MOHAMMED ABA AL-KHAYL INDICATED AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO US PROPOSAL OF HARMONIZED AND CONCERTED RESPONSE BY SAUDI ARABIA, IRAN, US AND OTHERS TO EGYPT'S APPEAL FOR EMERGENCY BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AID. THEY PROMISED EARLY CABINET CONSIDERATION AFTER ABA AL-KHAYL'S VISIT TO CAIRO, SCHEDULED MAY 24.

2. UNDER SECRETARY ROBINSON OUTLINED IN SUCCESSIVE CALLS TO MINISTER ABA AL-KHAYL AND PRINCE FAHD THE POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL CASES FOR PROMPT AND ADEQUATE RESPONSES BY EGYPT'S FRIENDS TO PRESIDENT SADAT'S APPEAL FOR ADDITIONAL AID TO FINANCE CURRENT IMPORTS AND REPAY SHORT-TERM COMMERCIAL BANK CREDITS. HE FURNISHED ON CONFIDENTIAL BASIS USG ANALYSIS OF EGYPTIAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND MEANS OF REDUCING NET DEFICIT TO ABOUT \$800 TO \$900

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PAGE 02 JIDDA 03635 221016Z

MILLION. HE SAID USG PREPARED TO SEEK CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR PROVIDING UP TO \$250 MILLION OF ADDITIONAL IMPORT FINANCING LOANS ON CONCESSIONAL TERMS TO EGYPT DURING REMAINDER CY 1975 IF SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN WOULD PROVIDE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL AMOUNTS, SUBJECT TO HARMONIZED CONDITIONS. THIS NUCLEUS GROUP WOULD SEEK ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES.

3. UNDER SECRETARY OUTLINED AND URGED SAUDI ARABIA TO EXPRESS SAME MINIMUM CONDITIONS USG WOULD REQUIRE, THAT IS,

A. NO REPAYMENT OF MILITARY DEBTS AND NO NET REPAYMENT ON CIVIL ACCOUNTS WITH MAJOR FOREIGN OFFICIAL CREDITORS IN NEXT 12 MONTHS;

BM GOE CONSULTATION WITH IBRD TECHNICAL TEAM LOOKING TO ESTABLISHMENT OF MORE EFFECTIVE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. HE ALSO SUGGESTED SAUDI INFLUENCE BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON NEED FOR REMOVING SERIOUS GOE OBSTACLES AND UNCERTAINTIES WHICH ARE NOW PREVENTING PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN EGYPT.

4. PRINCE FAHD SOUGHT ASSURANCE THAT US PROPOSAL DID NOT ENTAIL FORMATION OF CONSORTIUM BUT RATHER CONTEMPLATED BILATERAL AID ARRANGEMENTS HARMONIZED AS TO CONDITIONS AND TIMING. HE ALSO WAS CONCERNED THAT EXPANDED AID DEVOTED TO EGYPT'S FINANCIAL MAINTENANCE NOT BECOME A HABIT TO BE REPEATED ON SIMILAR SCALE IN 1976. UPON RECEIVING ASSURANCES ON THESE POINTS, HE SAID US APPROACH WAS "ABSOLUTELY RIGHT." HE SAID ABA AL-KHAYL PROBABLY WOULD TAKE MATTER TO CABINET SHORTLY AFTER RETURNING FROM CAIRO NEXT WEEK.

5. ABA AL-KHAYL AGREED TO ENCOURAGE GOE TO GET HELP OF IBRD IN PLANNING A MORE FORESIGHTED AND RESPONSIBLE SYSTEM FOR MANAGING FOREIGN EXCHANGE AVAILABILITIES. HE ALSO ENDORSED OTHER PROPOSED CONDITIONS (PARA 3).

6. FOR TEHRAN: REQUEST AMBASSADOR BRIEF ANSARY ON THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND CAIRO'S 5061, AND SEEK MAXIMUM IRANIAN PARTICIPATION.



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PAGE 03 JIOPA 03635 221016Z

7. FOR CAIRO: REQUEST EMBASSY CONFIDENTIALLY ADVISE
ABU ISMAIL OF POSITIVE BUT STILL QUALIFIED SAG RESPONSE
AND SUGGEST CONSISTENT GUE APPROACH TO ABA AL-KHAYL WITH
VIEW TO EARLY DECISION.
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